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ABSTRACT
Bowman's (1980, 1982) widely quoted papers have reported the
existence of a risk/return paradox for strategic management. In this
paper the authors examine the dynamic behavior of the risk/return
relationship and analyze whether the risk/return paradox is stable
across time. The analysis involves tracking Bowman's so-called nega-
tive association ratio across time. Using accounting measures of risk
and return, it is demonstrated that while the paradox holds during
the 1970's, the finding does not hold in the environment of the 1960's.
Further, the paradox disappears if market-based risk measures are used.
Some implications for strategic management are then discussed and atten-
tion is directed towards the meaning of risk in the context of strategic
management. In addition, possible explanations for this paradox are
evaluated and directions for further research are suggested.

Introduction
The concept of risk, is attracting increasing attention in the field
of strategic management. For example, Bettis (1983: 413) states that
"the term 'risk' is taken in modern financial theory to be a precise
technical term defining the probabilistic distribution of future market
returns. In the strategic management literature, however, it is often
taken (among other things) as a manager's subjective judgement of the
personal or organizational consequences that may result from a specific
decision or action." Baird and Thomas (1985) also stress the need for
conceptual models of strategic risk-taking which can be used to under-
stand the nature of strategic risk and to formulate strategic risk
policies.
Bowman's (1980, 1982) empirical papers have received considerable
attention from strategic management researchers. Bowman noted the
existence of a risk-return paradox for strategic management, namely,
that business risk and return are negatively correlated across com-
panies within most industries. Clearly this paradox runs counter to
the hypothesis of a positive correlation between risk and return com-
monly advanced in finance and economic theory (Brealey and Myers
(1981: 42); Van Home (1980: 72)).
Bettis and Hall (1982) and Bettis and Mahajan (1985) extend and verify
Bowman's results. In particular, they suggest that a negative relationship
is more likely to exist for related diversified than unrelated diversified
organizations (see Rumelt (1974) for an explanation of this taxonomy of cor-
porate diversification strategies). Bettis and Mahajan (1985: 796) also note
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the importance of industry characteristics in determining superior risk-
return performance. They therefore conclude that such factors as
diversification strategy and industry context may directly affect risk-
return performance.
Bowman (1982) advances a number of different explanations for the
risk/return paradox which can be classified into two broad categories:
(1) explanations involving management and planning factors and (2)
explanations involving firms' attitudes toward risk. Explanatory
hypotheses under heading (1) include the influence of good firm-level
strategic management which can, for example, simultaneously increase
returns and lower their variance. A dominant hypothesis in category
(2) is that lower profit (troubled firms) actively seek risks.
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine this paradox from a
number of perspectives. First, this study analyzes whether the
risk/return paradox is stable across time or whether it is dependent
upon the particular time period studied. The need for such dynamic
studies is also suggested by Bettis and Mahajan (1985: 6) when they
argue that risk-return studies of a dynamic character are needed to
explore changes in risk-return measures over time.
Second, the existence of the paradox is examined using both market
and accounting-based measures of risk. Bowman (1980: 25) and finance
theorists believe that the firm level paradox can be eliminated through
asset pricing in efficient markets. Thus, the use of market based risk
measures derived from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the
presence of efficient markets may compensate for anomalies in the beha-
vior of firms.
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Third, the relationship between risk-return performance and industry
characteristics is explored. For example, differences in industry en-
vironments may explain differences in risk-return profiles.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The paper begins with a brief
literature review which sets the context of the study, followed by a
discussion and examination of the method and results. The conclusions
and strategic management implications are then presented.
Review of Bowman's Research Findings
It is important to have a clear initial statement of Bowman's
research results. Bowman's 1982 article summarizes the basic findings
derived from risk-return analyses of two data bases, Value Line and
COMPUSTAT,^ in the following manner (Bowman, 1982: 35).
(i) Value Line Data Base
The main sample consisted of 85 industries and 1572 companies for
the nine-year period (1968-76). Of this total set of 85 industries,
56 supported the hypothesis of a negative correlation between risk and
return (statistically significant beyond 0.001), 21 refuted it and
eight were tied.
A smaller sample of 11 industries from Value Line was also analyzed
for the time period 1972-76. Ten out of the 11 industries studied
showed negative association over the five-year time period.
(ii ) Standard and Poor's Compustat® Data Base
The sample, analyzed by Treacy (1980), consisted of 54 (2 digit
SIC-Code) industries and 1458 companies for the ten-year period 1966-
75. Forty-three of the 54 industries had a correlation coefficient
that was negative (statistically significant beyond 0.00001) supporting
the paradox findings. Controlling for size of firm reduced the number
of negative partial correlations only slightly—from 43 to 39 of 54.
It should be noted that Bowman's measure of risk is accounting-
based (i.e., variance of returns) and targetted at the firm level.
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Un the other hand, modern finance literature and the capital asset
pricing model emphasizes the variance in returns to investors and advo-
cates the use of market-based risk measures. however, Bowman notes
that the strong correlation between market-based and accounting-based
risk measures (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes (1970)) provides an empirical
justification for using accounting-based risk measures. Further, since
accounting measures can be more directly controlled by corporate manage-
ment they are probably more valuable for firm-level strategic management,
In the following studies both market and accounting based measures
are used since they provide different insights about the relationship
between risk and return. While market measures focus around a capital
market perspective, accounting measures can be particularly useful for
managers of diversified firms. In such firms accounting measures pro-
vide managers with a direct assessment of business unit performance
whereas the calculation of the impact of the business unit on the
firm's stock price is less easily obtained.
HYPOTHESES, METHODS AND RESULTS
Examination of Negative Association Ratios Through Time
Bowman remarks in his 1980 paper (1980: 20) that "In sum, both
five-year periods and nine-year periods support the negative correla-
2
tion paradox beyond the statistical pale." Treacy (1980: 11) uses a
different ten-year time period (1966-75) in his study and notes that
"any bias introduced by the selection of tnis time period could not be
avoided." In this study we hypothesize that the negative association
ratio may not remain stable over time.
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It is clear from a number of sources (Hofer and Schendel (1978: 15),
Gluck, Kaufman and Walleck (198U: 157) and Business Week ("The New Breed
of Strategic Planner," 17 Sept. 1984: 63) among others) that the 196U's
and 1970's had markedly different strategic characteristics. The 1960's
were a boom decade in which growth seemed eternal, where market struc-
tures were relatively stable, where inflation rates were low and where
the diet of alternative strategic options seemed rich and almost un-
bounded. On the other hand, the 1970's saw the rise of the conglomerate,
the energy crunch and the advent of added complexity in strategic
decision-making arising from increasing rates of environmental change
and competitive pressure. Consequently, the 1970's business environ-
ment was less predictable, ill-structured and required much more effort
to be focused upon the recognition of the limited number of opportuni-
ties which would provide the firm with a successful future. As a result,
it is hypothesized here that the risk-return paradox (formulated in terms
of accounting risk measures) would be more evident in the environment
3
of the 1970's than the 1960's. This is formulated as proposition 1.
Proposition 1
The negative association ratio (risk-return paradox) is
more likely to exist in the more uncertain environment of the
1970's than the more predictable and stable environment of
the 1960's.
In order to test this proposition, the methodology developed in the
Bowman (1980) paper is adapted for this study in the following sense.
For each of the sixty-three two-digit SIC industries represented on the
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®
CUMPUSTAT data base, separate Bowman-type risk-return analyses were per-
formed for the non-overlapping five-year time periods 1960-64, 1965-69,
1970-74 and 1975-79 using the CUMPUSTAT data base. In these time
periods the number of industries in the research sample was 37 for 1960-
64, 50 for 1965-69, 55 for 1970-74 and 56 for 1975-79. This resulted
from the researchers sample selection criteria which required that each
company must have at least three years of data for the relevant time
period and each industry must have at least six companies in the sample
to ensure meaningful estimates of mean and variance.
The risk-return calculations closely followed Bowman's procedure.
Therefore, for each time period, the average ROE and variance of ROE
were calculated from annual data for ROE derived for each firm in each
two-digit industry. Within each industry a rank order of all companies
for each characteristic—ROE and ROE variance—was constructed and then
4
divided at the median. Each company was then deemed to be High or Low
on each of the characteristics leading to one of four possibilities (or
quadrants in a two by two contingency table): High RUE, High Variance
(HH), High ROE, Low Variance (HL) , Low RUE, High Variance (LH) and Low
ROE, Low Variance (LL) . Negative association ratios (i.e., (HL + LH)
divided by (HH + LL)) were calculated for each two digit industry for
each of the four non-overlapping five-year time periods.
The results of this exercise are shown for each industry and
time period in Table 1. There is mucn stronger evidence of negative
Insert Table 1 About Here
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association for the two later periods than for the two earlier time
periods. Notice that 72% of the industries showed negative association
for 1970-74 and nearly 70% showed negative association for 1975-79.
indeed, using a binomial test similar to Bowman's (1980) version, the
negative association ratio is shown to be statistically significant at
the 10% level for both the 1970-74 and 1975-79 time periods. There is
also evidence of significant positive association for the 1965-b9 time
period and inconclusive results for 1960-64 (though indicating positive
association (see the negative association ratio of 37% in Table 1)).
On balance, the research results provide strong support for Proposition
1. Indeed, these findings tend to suggest that the choice of time
period (which itself may reflect wider environmental influences) may
critically offset the finding of negative association between risk and
return.
Further, in studying Table 1 it should also be noticed that the
values of the negative association ratios change over time for virtually
all of the industries studied. This is demonstrated clearly since the
ratio never consistently maintains a value either above or below 1 for
most of the industries studied here. Therefore, there is evidence of
instability in the direction of the risk/return relationship which
suggests that macro economic and other environmental factors may affect
risk/return performance.
Industry Effects
One environmental factor which may influence the risk/return find-
ings is the industry environment, i.e., since industries have wide
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variations in average risk and performance levels, it could be hypothe-
sized that a firm's risk/return performance may be strongly influenced
by the industry environment in which it competes.
Bowman (1980: 27) notes that some industries (e.g., regulated
industries) may be more prone to exhibit positive association than
others. He suggests that a close study of such industry characteristics
as the extent of industry concentration or the stage of the industry
life cycle may explain the influence of industry environment on risk-
return relationships.
Researchers in strategic management, economics and finance have
sought to understand the relationships between market power (measured
in terms of such variables as concentration ratios, market shares and
firm size) and risk/return characteristics. In strategy the PIMS
studies (e.g., Buzzell, Gale and Sultan (1975)) have noted the strong
correlations between market share and profitability (return). Treacy
(1980: 35) investigated the relationship between firm size and the
risk-return profile and concluded that firm size does not by itself
explain the negative association of level and variance of return on
shareholders' equity within an industry. However, a number of finance
and economics researchers (e.g., Melicher, Rush and Winn (1976), Winn
(1977), Sullivan (1978), and Moyers and Chatfield (1983)) have produced
evidence to support a negative relationship between risk and market
power variables. In general, therefore, these researchers provide
strong evidence for the proposition that market power may convey oppor-
tunities for firms to absorb adverse effects and obtain advantageous
risk-return profiles (particularly in the direction of high return, low
risk)
.
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In this study the market power hypothesis has not been tested
because of the difficulty of obtaining adequate data on concentration
ratios and market share on an annual basis. Rather this study has
concentrated upon an examination of the life cycle effect.
Life cycle concepts have been discussed at the level of firms (e.g.,
Chandler (1962)); of products (e.g., Kotler (1980)); and of industries
(e.g., Shepherd (1979)). It is clear that industries go through phases
such as birth/growth, maturity and decline in which different cost and
demand characteristics apply. Typically, the industrial organization
literature suggests that high growth industries (with relatively fewer
competitors) exhibit higher average profitability than more mature
industries (with newer entrants present) and declining industries (with
substitute products emerging through time). In addition, growth indus-
tries tend to exhibit positive risk-return profiles whereas declining
industries would tend to exhibit negative risk-return profiles.
In this study the following propositions about industries and risk-
return relationships are advanced:
Proposition 2a
That there will be stronger evidence of positive association
for growth (high ROE) industries and stronger evidence of negative
association for declining (low ROE) industries.
Proposition 2b
If the risk-return relationship is time-dependent (Proposition
1) then it is suggested that growth industries (high ROE industries)
may exhibit strong positive correlation in the periods of economic
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stability (the 1960's) whereas declining industries (low ROE indus-
tries) may exhibit strong negative correlation in periods of greater
environmental turbulence (the 1970's).
In order to test these propositions, the research sample of indus-
tries (see Table 1) has been re-worked in order to identify industries
in each period as being in one of three categories: High relative ROE
(Birth/Growth), Medium ROE (Mature) and Low ROE (Decline). The classi-
fications of High, Medium and Low in each time period were obtained by
dividing the overall industry ROE distribution into tertiles correspond-
ing to the upper one-third, middle one-third, and lower one-third of the
distribution. Table 2 shows the results of this exercise.
Insert Table 2 About Here
First, Proposition 2a appears to be strongly supported. High ROE
industries show much stronger evidence of significant positive associa-
tion whereas low ROE industries exhibit a tendency towards negative
association.
Second, Proposition 2b is also strongly supported. Low ROE indus-
tries show significant negative association for the periods of environ-
mental uncertainty (1970-74 and 1975-79) whereas high ROE industries
show significant positive association for the periods of environmental
stability (1960-64 and 1965-69).
The support for these results suggests that industry level factors
may begin to throw light upon the risk-return paradox. However, even
richer explanations for these phenomena must be obtained by examining
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firm-level behavior for several of the industries shown in Table 1 in
greater detail. For example, some consistently low performing industries
such as furniture, paper, holding companies and hotels show strong con-
sistent evidence of negative association whereas others in the low per-
forming category such as textiles, agricultural production and construc-
tion show oscillatory risk-return profiles over time. Similarly, some
highly profitable industries such as leather, chemicals, printing and
motor freight also show oscillatory risk-return profiles over time.
Handling Market Based Ris k Measures
The evidence in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that time effects (and such
associated environmental correlates as industry and economic factors)
may influence the relationship between risk and return. However, it is
possible that risk/return performance may also depend upon the measure
of risk chosen in the research.
Bowman states (1980: 28) that "given that a negative correlation
between risk and return (to the firm) within industries is established
here, in what way, if any, does this idea carry over into the capital
markets?" He speculates that it is unlikely that a market imperfection
would be discovered. He explains that the negative association anomaly
or paradox at the firm level can be eliminated in stock markets through
the pricing mechanism. Firms with lower risks and higher returns can
have their stocks priced relatively higher by the market, which lowers
the return to the stock purchaser and thus eliminates the paradox at
the level of the stockholder.
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If the preceding argument is true, then the following proposition
about the risk-return paradox (couched in terras of market based
measures of risk) should hold:
Proposition 3
Using a market based risk measure (such as the beta from
the capital asset pricing model) will mask the firm-level risk-
return paradox. The "perfect" market will both compensate for and
mask the effects of the risk-return paradox.
Insert Table 3 About Here
Table 3 shows the negative association ratios calculated using a
market-based risk measure, the beta (or systematic risk) measure,
derived from application of the capital asset pricing model (see
Brealey and Myers (1981)). The results indicate that from the perspec-
tive of a market-based risk measure the risk-return paradox does not
exist. Therefore, proposition 3 holds for this research sample.
Insert Table 4 About Here
In parallel with the previous study of industry effects, Table 4
examines whether in fact there is more evidence of significant negative
association for low ROE rather than high RUE industries using the beta
measure. The results show clearly that there is no evidence at all of
the negative risk-return paradox for industries with different perfor-
mance levels when a market based risk measure is used. Therefore,
Proposition 3 appears to hold and it is, therefore, clear that the
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negative association paradox is not a problem when viewed from a capi-
tal markets perspective.
Summary of Research Results
In summary the research results presented in Tables 1 to 4 suggest
that the following propositions hold. First, the risk-return paradox
appears to be dependent upon the time period adopted in the study. It
appears more likely to hold in more uncertain, less predictable en-
vironments such as the decade of the 1970' s.
Second, better performing industries tend to exhibit positive risk-
return associations whereas low performing industries appear to be more
prone to exhibit negative association. Further, this negative asso-
ciation tendency is more closely associated with the uncertain environ-
ments of the 1970' s.
Third, the use of market-based risk measures (betas) in calculating
risk-return correlations tends to eliminate the risk-return paradox.
Thus, the paradox exists at the firm-level (where accounting based
risk measures are most often used) and is not a problem at the level
of capital markets.
Implications and Conclusions
Bowman's (1980, 1982) and Treacy's (1980) findings of a negative
risk-return relationship provided the springboard for the current re-
search. By tracking the dynamic behavior of Bowman's negative asso-
ciation ratio it was demonstrated that the risk/return paradox varies
across time. In particular, with variance of returns as a risk
measure significant positive association was found for the 1965-69
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time period, whereas tne 1970-74 and 1975-79 periods showed much
stronger evidence of significant negative association. This suggests
that the markedly different and less stable environmental and economic
conditions of the 1970's may provide some justification for the risk-
return paradox. Further, it was also evident that the negative asso-
ciation finding was dependent upon the choice of a market or accounting-
based risk measure. The risk-return paradox is not present when a
market-based risk measure is used. Yet while the market-based measure
is important from a "financial markets" perspective, the accounting-
based measure (or "total risk") is valuable from a strategic risk
management perspective. As Bowman (1984: 70) points out: "It is the
total risk which is their (managers') risk, and a better understanding
of total risk at the level of the firm, and managers' attitudes to it
under various circumstances—aversion, neutrality, or seeking—is
warranted.
"
These, and other studies including Bettis and Mahajan (1985),
indicate a number of important directions for future research.
First, risk/return relationships must be studied more closely at
the level of the individual industry. Bettis and Mahajan (1985: 796)
stress the influence of industry characteristics on risk-return profiles.
They point out, following Rumelt's example, that an unfavorable industry
environment may constrain a firm's performance expectations (they quote
Rumelt's observation, "You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear").
Risks clearly vary as a function of the competitive characteristics of
each industry environment and of the organizations which comprise the
industry. Porter (1980) and others have highlighted the range of
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factors which must be considered in formulating competitive strategy.
Baird and Thomas (1985: 28) provide an inventory of risk characteristics
(ranging from the number of competitors, mobility barriers and the
industry life cycle to the size and age of the organization) at the
industry and organizational levels which provide a rich set of proposi-
tions for further research. Among them there is a need for a close re-
examination of the relationship between market power and risk. While
Treacy (1980) found that firm size did not explain the negative risk-
return relationship, a range of finance and economics researchers
(quoted earlier in the paper) found consistent negative association
between market power and risk. An inventory of these alternative
research efforts, focusing on methodological and conceptual differences
would be of great value. It might lead to both empirical re-examination
and further conceptualization of research propositions.
Second, further examination of the hypothesis that troubled com-
panies take larger risks (Bowman (1982:40)) seems to be justified.
While this industry-level study only offers some indirect support for
this hypothesis, it nevertheless indicates appropriate future research
avenues. Clearly, the various managerial explanations—such as agency
theory—of this risk-seeking tendency should be tested empirically
using a within-industry sample. In addition, from a strategic manage-
ment viewpoint, an evaluation of the role of alternative diver-
sification strategies in handling and managing risk should be under-
taken over a wide range of industries and companies. Bettis and Hall
(1982) and Bettis and Mahajan (1985) both conclude that diversifica-
tion strategy may directly affect risk-return performance. Bowman
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(1982:41) also speculates that large diversified firms may be better
able to support the risk-seeking and innovatory behavior of troubled
divisions than headquarters managements of other firms which set spe-
cific divisional targets.
Third, more research is needed into the definition of appropriate
measures of risk for strategy research. One level of concern is that
while risk is an ex ante concept, it is typically measured ex post
(Bowman, 1982: 34). Bettis (1983) argues that managers should be con-
cerned primarily with unsystematic risk and that strategies should be
couched in terms of total risk. In other words "strategic adaptation
by skillful, rigorous, and continuous management of unsystematic risk,
lies at the very heart of strategic management" (Bettis, 1983: 408).
Armour and Teece (1978), Bettis and Hall (1982), Bowman (1980) and
others have used income variability as a proxy for risk. This proxy,
however, may not adequately reflect the perceptions of corporate managers
(Litzenberger and Rao (1971)). Barefield and Comiskey (1975) note that
the predictable portion of earnings variability should have no effect
on market returns. They suggest that forecast error might therefore be
used to represent corporate risk.
Another level of concern centers around whose risk is important for
strategic decision-making. For example, risk-return tradeoffs may be
examined from a managerial viewpoint. Smith (1976), Bowman (1980) and
others observe that manager controlled firms tend to generate smoother
earnings and exhibit lower systematic risk than owner-controlled firms.
Clearly the important research issue is to identify which stakeholder( s)
viewpoint (owner, manager, shareholder, etc.) is important in strategic
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decision-making since it is those stakeholder risk perceptions which
affect strategic decisions.
A fourth level of concern is the potential biases in the calculation
and interpretation of risk measures. For example, the mean-variance
approach suffers from the fact that it ignores the path or time series
pattern of the risk-return measures. The same mean and variance can be
obtained from quite different risk-return paths.
Finally, both this research and the earlier studies can be criti-
cized for aggregating the risk-return analysis across time periods
(i.e., five year periods in this study vs. nine to ten-year periods in
the Bowman/Treacy studies). It seems sensible to research the dynamic
characteristics of risk return measures on an annual basis. This sug-
gests that time series analysis methods (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985: 4)
need to be more widely used in order to understand and analyze risk-
return relationships in the strategy field.
These research directions, and this paper's results, should lead us
to focus upon the question of "What is risk anyway for the strategic
manager?" Bowman's (1984) paper argues for risk measures which reflect
the behavioral importance of total risk (rather than market-based risk)
to strategic managers. The total risk perspective is highlighted by
Bettis (1983) and Hertz and Thomas (1983).
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FOOTNOTES
Finance-based researchers (for example, Marsh and Swanson (1984))
have also questioned the existence of the paradox on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. See Bowman (1984) and Marsh and Swanson for an
interesting debate on these issues.
2
Bowman uses a binomial test to confirm the statistical validity of
his results (see Bowman (1980), pages 20 and 29).
3
This hypothesis is also suggested by Bowman's (1980, 1982) results
quoted in the paper. Whereas 66 % (56 out of 85) of industries exhibited
negative correlation in the 1966-75 study (Bowman, 1980), fully 90%
(10 out of 11) of industries exhibited negative correlation for the
shorter time period 1972-76 (Bowman, 1982).
4
Note that the detail of the calculations for ROE and ROE variance
follows exactly from Bowman's (1980) article. Although mean/variance
approaches are used here to facilitate comparison with Bowman's results
it is clear that the mean/variance approach may produce biased perfor-
mance measures because of small samples and because it ignores the
potential presence of autocorrelation in the data samples.
The null hypothesis in Bowman's (1980) article is that if there is
no relation between risk, and return, half of the correlations should be
negative and half should be positive (i.e., for significant negative
association (itself a function of sample size) the proportion of nega-
tive associations would be significantly greater than 50%).
The negative association ratios for the market-based risk measure
(beta (3) or systematic risk) were calculated in the following manner.
The beta values were calculated by ordinary least squares using the
capital asset pricing model for the relevant five-year periods (60
monthly observations) from the CRSP (Center for Research in Security
Prices, Chicago) tapes. A value weighted market return, including
ordinary dividends, was used as a proxy for the market return. The
derived beta measures for each firm (and the industry) were then used
to define 'high' and 'low' on the market-based risk characteristic.
Thus, the HH, HL , LH and LL cells of the risk-return matrix were
defined. Finally, it should be noted that the CRSP and Compustat tapes
did not match perfectly because of missing observations. This led to
smaller but satisfactory size samples using the CRSP rather than the
Compustat tapes.
-19-
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TABLE 1: NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION RATIOS FOR 57 INDUSTRIES FOR VARIOUS TIME PERIODS
Industry name SIC Code 1960- 64 _19_65_- 1969 1970-.L974 1975- 1'.
1. Agricultural production 1
(27)
a
.5 (6) .33 (8) 1.33 (
2. Metal mining 10 .80 .43 (33) .43 (33) .73 , _
3. Bituminous coal 12 2.0 (9) .66 U0) 1.0 (1
4. Oil and gas extraction 13 1.27 (25) 1.75 (44) 1.58 (62) 1.05
'
',
5. Building construction 15 0.0 (7) .44 (13) 1.40 (24) 2.0 k i
6. Construction other than
building
16 2.66 (11) .40 (14) 2.0 (18) .80 (1
7. Food and kindred products 20 1.02 (43) .60 (90) 1.15 (97) 1.82 < t
8. Tobacco manufactures 21 .80 (9) 2.0 (9) 2.0 (9) 1.50 (i
9. Textile mill products 22 .85 (26) 1.05 (35) .81 (49) 1.68 i -
10. Apparel and other finished
products
23 .28 (27) .56 (39) 1.12 (53) 1.61 ( c
11. Lumber and wood products 24 1.20 (11) .46 (19) 2.22 (29) 5.20
12. Furniture and fixtures 25 1.50 (10) 2.66 (11) 2.66 (1
13. Paper and allied products 26 1.25 (36) .56 (39) 1.62 (42) 1.33 u
14. Printing 27 1.40 (24) .69 (39) 1.47 (47) .60 u
15. Chemicals and allied products 28 .95 (86) .59 (97) 1.26 (104) 1.05 [1
16. Petroleum refining 29 .85 (39) .64 (41) 1.23 I(47) .62 [4
17. Rubber and miscellaneous 30 1.14 (30) .18 (38) .81 (40) 1.33 {4
18. Leather 31 1.0 (12) 1.0 (16) 1.25 l(18) 1.71 (1
19. Stone, clay and glass 32 .47 (25) .47 (31) 1.17 (37) .66 [4
20. Primary metal industries 33 .89 (55) .75 (65) .68 1(69) 1.55 (6
21. Fabricated metal products 34 .77 (55) .68 (74) 1.57 (85) 1.14 (9
22. Machinery 35 .92 (100) 1.06 (136) 1.52 (159) 1.26 (1
23. Electrical and electronic 36 1.30 (92) .76 (120) 1.32 1(137) 1.48 ;i
24. Transportation equipment 37 1.31 (67) .58 (76) 1.29 (85) 1.12 (a
25. Measuring instruments 38 .45 (32) .64 (51) 1.11 (57) 1.80 (5
26. Miscellaneous manufacturing
industries
39 1.66 (16) 1.55 (23) 1.12 ((34) 1.05 (3
27. Railroad transportation 40 2.66 (11) .88 1(17) .80 ;i
28. Motor freight transportation 42 .54 (17) .46 (19) 1.20 ( 22) 1.75 ' 2
29. Water transportation 44 2.0 \
30. Transportation by air 45 1.20 (22) 1.0 (24) 1.16 ((26) 2.85 [2
31. Transportation services 47 .50 (6) 2.0 (6) 6.0 (
32. Communication 48 .57 (22) .31 (25) .55 ((28) .55 <[2
33. Electric, gas and sanitary
service
49 .80 (152) .83 (158) .89 ((165) 1.0 ( i
34. Wholesale trade - durable goods 50 1.60 (26) .81 (40) 1.78 ( 53) 1.20 < 5
35. Wholesale trade - nondurable
goods
51 .72 (19) .44 (26) 1.81 ( 31) 1.20 ( 3
36. Building materials 52 1.33 (7) 1.33 (
37. General merchandise stores 53 .50 (30) .58 (38) .81 ( 49) 1.13 ( 4
38. Food stores 54 .80 (27) .41 (34) 3.0 ( 40) 2.33 ( 4
39. Apparel and accessory stores 56 .20 (12) 1.42 ( 1
40. Furniture stores 57 3.0 ( 16)
41. Eating and drinking places 58 .85 (13) 1.50 ( 20) 1.0 ( 2
TABLE 1 (continued)
Industry name SIC Code 1960-64 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979
\2. Miscellaneous retail 59 .76 (23) .36 (30) .80 (45) 1.40 (48)
t3. Banking 60 .45 (45) .72 (114) 1.09 (134) 2.85 (135)
>4. Credit agencies other than 61 .lb (14) .76 (23) 2.0 (27) .75 (28)
banks
>5 . Security and commodity brokers 62 2.0 (9) .28 (9)
h6 . Insurance 63 1.29 (39) 1.20 (44)
rf , Real estate 65 1.33 (14) 1.27 (25) .70 (29)
>8 . Holding and other investment 67 2.0 (6) 2.20 (32) 2.0 (33)
offices
9. Hotels 70 2.0 (6) 1.0 (12) 2.50 (14) 2.5 (14)
0. Personal services 72 .40 (81) 1.0 (8) 1.0 (8)
1. Business services 73 .80 (18) .51 (41) 1.54 (56) 1.28 (57)
2. Automotive repair 75 2.0 (6) .50 (6)
3. Motion pictures 78 2.0 (6) .50 (6) 2.0 (6)
4. Amusement and recreation 79 .40 (7) 1.0 (8)
services
5. Health services 80 .50 (6) 1.11 (19) .72 (19)
6. Miscellaneous services 89 2.0 (6) 1.20 (11) 2.0 (12)
7. Nonclassif iable establishment 99 2.0 (7) .28 (18) 1.0 (20) 1.5 (20)
•verall number of companies 1283 1930 2302 2394
umber of industries with negative 14 12 40 39
association
[umber of industries with tied 2 3 2 5
(indeterminate) association
umber of industries with positive 21 35 13 12
association
'otal number of industries ,
iverall Negative Association Ratio
37 50 55 56
37% 24%* 72%* 69.6%*
totes to Table
The figures in parentheses denote the total number of firms in each two digit industry for
each time period.
i. Denotes percentage of industries with negative association ratio.
Denotes significant value (p * 0.5) at a < 0.1 (10% level) [where p is the proportion of
negative associations].
TABLE 2: NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION RATIOS (ROE VS. VAR(ROE))
FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS AND FOR LOW, MEDIUM,
AND HIGH ROE INDUSTRIES
'eriod
Industry
ROE
Low Relative ROE (Lower Tertile
Medium (Middle Tertile)
High (Upper Tertile)
Total sample
1960-64
58% (7)'
50% (6)
8.3%* (1)
37% (14)
1965-69
47% (8)
17.6%* (3)
5.8%* (1)
24%* (12)
1970-74
77.7%* (14)
77.7%* (14)
66.6% (12)
72%* (40)
1975-79
78.8%* (15)
66.6% (12)
66.6% (12)
69.6%* (39)
Notes to Table
a
(i) denotes number of industries with negative association in each tertile
(ii) * denotes significant value (p * 0.5) at a _< 0.1 (10% level) [where p is the
proportion of negative associations].
TABLE 3: NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION RATIOS FOR 38 INDUSTRIES FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS
(USING ROE TO MEASURE RETURN AND BETA (B) TO MEASURE RISK)
SIC
Industry name Code 1960--64 1965--1969 1970- 1974 1975-.L979
1. Metal mining 10 .59 (8) .71 (12) 1.49 (15) 1.0 (16)
2. Bituminous coal 12 .66 (5) .66 (5) .5 (6)
3. Oil and gas extraction 13 .4 (7) .5 (12) 2.0 (15)
4. Construction 16 4.0 (5) .59 (8) 2.0 (9)
5. Food and kindred products 20 .63 (31) 1.78 (42) 1.77 (47) 1.76 (57)
6. Tobacco manufactures 21 .4 (7) 1.78 (6) 1.33 (7)
7. Textile 22 2.0 (9) .33 (12) 1.0 (16) 1.10 (19)
8. Apparel 23 .4 (7) .85 (13) .28 (17) 1.5b (23)
9. Lumber 24 .6b (5) 1.20 (11)
10. Paper and allied products 26 1.33 (14) 1.10 (21) .92 1(25)
11. Printing and publishing 27 2.0 (9) 1.28 (16) 1.33 (21)
12. Chemicals 28 .75 (28) 1.31 (51) 1.28 (64) 1.12 (68)
13. Petroleum 29 1.33 (14) .92 (25) .8 (27) 1.28 (32)
14. Rubber 30 1.33 (7) .75 (14) 1.42 (17) .4 (21)
15. Leather 31 .5 (6) 1.33 (7)
16. Stone and clay 32 5.0 (6) 1.0 (16) .69 (17) .83 1(22)
17. Primary metal 33 .80 (18) 1.33 (28) 1.53 (33) .85 (39)
18. Fabricated metal 34 .4 (7) 2.22 (16) 1.16 (26) .73 (33)
19. Machinery 35 1.35 (33) 1.49 (55) 1.21 (71) 1.58 (88)
20. Electronic machinery 3b 1.0 (20) 1.31 (37) 1.47 (47) 1.47 (57)
21. Transportation equipment 37 .64 (33) 1.10 (38) .68 (42) .87 (47)
22. Measuring instruments 38 1.33 (7) 2.0 (21) 2.63 (29) 2.0 <(30)
23. Miscellaneous 39 4.54 (5) 10.0 I(11)
24. Railroad 40 4.0 (10) .4 (14) 1.66 (16)
25. Transportation by air 45 1.0 (8) 1.49 (10) .75 (14) 2.0 <:i5)
26. Communication 48 .5 (12) .54 (17) .42 (•20)
27. Electric services 49 .b2 (86) .77 (96) .68 (111) .82 (:i28)
28. Wholesale trade 50 .66 (5) 1.0 (8)
29. Wholesale trade 51 2.0 (6) .44 (13) 1.13 (:i5)
30. General merchandise stores 53 .44 (13) 1.0 (18) 1.56 (23) 1.0 ((28)
31. Food stores 54 1.49 (5) 2.0 (9) .5 (15) 2.38 ( 17)
32. Eating and drinking places 58 .66 (.10)
33. Miscellaneous retail 59 .5 (12) 1.33 ( 21)
34. Banking 60 .57 (11) .70 ( 29)
35. Credit agencies bl 9.09 (10) 1.13 (15) 1.25 (:i8)
3b. Security and commodity
brokers
62 2.0 (6)
TAiiLE 3 (continued)
SIC
Industry name Code 196U-64 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979
37. Insurance 63 .28 (9) .3b (15)
38. Holding offices 67 5.88 (14)
Overall number of companies 340 598 811 1024
Number of industries with 7 16 15 23
negative association
Number of industries with tied 2 2 1 3
association
Total number of industries 18 28 35 38
% of industries with nega- 38 % 57% 42% 60%
tive association
i i
Notes to Table
(i) The figures in parentheses denote the total number of firms in each 2 digit
industry for each time period,
(ii) Using a binomial statistical test no one of the negative association ratios
is significantly different from 0.5 at the chosen 10% significance level.
Therefore, there is no evidence of negative association in this table.
TAliLE 4: NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION RATIOS (ROE VS. 6)
FOR DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS AND FOR LOW, MEDIUM,
AND HIGH ROE INDUSTRIES
"~^-\^^ Period
Industry ROE^^ 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79
Low 33.3% (2)
a
44.4% (4) 50.0% (6) 46.1% (6)
Medium 50% (3) 66.6% (6) 58.3% (7) 61.5% (8)
High 33.3% (2) 66.6% (6) 33.3% (4) 69.2% (9)
Total sample 38.8% (7) 57.1% (16) 42.8% (15) 60.5% (23)
Notes: (i) is number of industries with negative association.
(ii) Using binomial statistical test no one of the negative
association estimates is significantly different from .5
(i.e., there is no evidence of significant negative asso-
ciation for low v. high ROE industries or for the overall
sample)
.
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